Introduction
Research on political macroeconomics during the last 20 years focused on factors affecting monetary policy and its performances. Several studies have examined the cause of monetary instability pointing out the key role of the Central Bank Independence (henceforth CBI) to account for differences in inflation rates among countries. It is widely documented, that a higher degree of CBI is associated with a lower inflation rate and that society reduces opposition to inflation and public pressure for an independent central bank (Cukierman, 2008 (Cukierman, , 2013 Stella, 2010 for a review). The balance between flexibility and credibility in monetary policymaking determines the equilibrium degree of CBI in a country. At the same time, the trade-off between costs and benefits in delegating the power to manage paper money may depend on many aspects of the economy and on its institutional framework (Alesina and Grilli, 1995) . The recognition of this fact has encouraged the study of the determinants that influence the CBI among the variety of economic, social and institutional variables that cause changes in the degree of commitment of the monetary policy. A partial list includes Farvaque (2002) , Polillo and Guillén (2005) Pistoresi et al. (2011) , Spyromitros and Tuysuz (2012) , and Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) .
Nowadays the "inflation problem" is that inflation is too low, not too high. Differently from the past, where the main goal of the central banks was to maintain an acceptable level of inflation, financial stability is now the new objective both in terms of macro-prudential supervision and to the traditional pursuit of macroeconomic stability.
Following the main financial crisis since 1998, e.g. South Korea in 1998, Turkey in 2001, the Dot-come bubble 1999-2000 and in particular the Great financial crisis in [2007] [2008] , many central banks turned to forward guidance and/or a variety of unconventional monetary policies, such as lending to banks (and sometimes even to nonbanks) in huge volume, and large-scale asset purchases ("quantitative easing") that is they use their balance sheets to affect market conditions (see De Haan and Eijffinger, 2017) . Some of these behaviours, in particular those associated with the expanded fiscal role of central banks, can be also associated with the weaknesses of political institutions. According to Buiter (2016) In this economic and political climate, some important questions arise: has the CBI decreased since the main financial crisis since? Has the role of economic and political determinants of CBI changed? Are there differences among OECD and non-OECD economies with respect to these topics? The goal of this paper is to investigate these issues. In particular, this paper analyses the determinants of a new CBI index recently provided by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) , from a large set of economic, political and institutional variables. Our sample regards 31 OECD and 49 non-OECD economies and covers the sample period 1998-2010.
To this aim, we employ factor analysis as an appropriate statistical technique to deal with large amounts of data, as it retains a high power of data reduction and facilitate the design of aggregated variables. Moreover, it is possible to analyse the interrelations among a large list of indicators in order to understand their underlying structure, making it possible to reduce information into a small number of aggregated variables. Since factors can be saved and used in further analysis, this technique reduces the chance of double-counting highly similar attributes (multicollinearity) as well as possible biases from having redundant exogenous variables in regression (overfitting). In fact, we are then able to evaluate the relative importance of each aggregate variable (factor) on CBI in a linear regression framework. In other words, we can select determinants of CBI given a large amount of information coming from the initial database and, at the same time, avoid collinearity issues since correlated variables are already grouped in the factor analysis step.
Our results show no evidence of CBI decreasing after the Great financial crisis, but identify new relevant determinants with respect to the previous literature. In particular, we confirm a key role of the IMF loans program as an international constraint, which seems to guide all the economies in their choice toward independent central banks. Financial instability, recession and low inflation work in the opposite direction with governments relying extensively on central bank money to finance public expenditure. In this context, central banks' political and operational autonomy is inevitably undermined for the fulfillment of their policy objective of preserving price stability. Finally, the degree of CBI in non-OECD economies responds to various measures of strength of political institutions: the less is the strength of political institution, the higher is the incentive to delegate to an independent central bank, except for corruption. In fact, greater the level of corruption, higher is the incentive to delegate to an independent central bank. Non-OECD countries with more party political instability due to heterogeneous political contexts have a higher incentive to delegate to a more independent central bank. The delegation to an independent central bank is a way to facilitate the cohesistence of actors with heterogeneous preferences within the executive, i.e. coalition or minority goverment, in particular when information asymmetries are presents, for example, between coalition goverment parties and the executive.
Moreover, multiparty goverment are heavily dependent on the use of fiscal policy, and this increases the incentive to delegate in the hands of an independent institution (non-targetable) the monetary policy or unpopular policies maximising the probability to be re-elected.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe in detail the considered dataset. Section 3 presents the employed methodology and empirical results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
Data
We examine the determinants of CBI using a new index recently provided by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) , (denoted by the authors as CBIW). It is based on the index of legal independence by Cukierman et al. (1992) (called in short CWN index), but for the period 1998-2010. The CWN index is based on measures such as the independence of the governor of the central bank, its independence in policy formulation, its objective or mandate, and the limits on its lendings to the public sector. On top of that, the CBIW is augmented by adding other aspects of the CBI ("de-facto" criteria) emphasized by the subsequent literature: limits on the reappointment of the governor, measures of provisions affecting (re)appointment of board members similar to those affecting the governor, restrictions on government representation on the board, and intervention of the government in exchange rate policy formulation. and Macedonia. The graph suggests that countries with lower level of development and democracy are investing in reform processes, probably due to international pressure (e.g. from IMF) to ensure financial and price stability.
In conclusion, there is no evidence that the CBIW index has decreased not even after the Great financial crisis. The political variables are taken from different sources. In particular, Stability (presence/absence of terrorism or political violence), Rule of Law (the confidence of the agents in societies rules, e.g. the quality of contracts enforcement and defense of property rights), GovEffectiveness (quality of public services, effectiveness of policies, credibility of government effort in the actuation of such policies), Accountability (perception of citizens to participate to the selection of their government members, freedom of speech and presence of free media),
RegulatoryQ (ability of government to make laws and regulations to promote the development of the private sector), and Corruption (corruption of public institutions, magnitude of corrupting acts and the presence of "elite" and private interests at the head of state government) are taken from WGI database. Legal origin (civil or common-law system) and Transparency are obtained from Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) . Finally, Democracy (the possibility to express different preferences on different political alternatives, the existence of constraints on the exercise of power by the executive, the guarantee of political and civil liberties) is taken from Polity IV database. Also these variables are averaged over the selected years.
The institutional variables are found in the DPI database of the World Bank, originally published by Beck et al. 
Results
The resulting dataset has been analysed using well-known statistical tools such as factor analysis and linear parametric modelling. Firstly, factors are identified and variables grouped to specify a particular aspect of the initial dataset. Secondly, we evaluate the relative importance of each factor as determinants of CBI index.
Factor Analysis
The factors are identified following the recommended guidelines of Hair et al. (1995) and their number is selected in accordance to the Kaiser criterion of corresponding eigenvalues greater than one in modulus.
Moreover, the cumulative explained variance of each selected factor is also reported and it is satisfactory.
The analysis of the component matrices in Tables 1 and 2 indicates the type of dimension captured. Table 1 considers factors extracted from the economic and political groups. The first factor, named "political factor", mainly captures different measures of strength of political institutions, since it is highly positively correlated to the group of political variables (with correlation higher than 0.9): Rule of Law, GovEffectivness, Accountability, RegulatoryQ and Corruption. The second factor is only directly related to the degree of openness of the economy (with correlation higher than 0.7) and for this reason we label it as "openness factor". Finally, the third factor is directly related to the national deficit to GDP and indirectly related to the IMF lending to GDP, so we name it "financial factor" (with major correlation over 0.57). Table 2 shows correlations between the institutional variables and the extracted factors. Particularly, the first and the second factors are positively related to characteristics of the parties that make up the legislative power. The "opposition factor" is directly related to the number of seats of the first-largest, second-largest and third-largest opposition parties (with correlation greater than 0.75). Moreover, it relates to the total number of seats of the opposition coalition and to the total seats of the parliament in the legislature. The "goverment factor" is directly related to the number of seats of the first-largest government party and to the total number of seats of the goverment (correlations are higher than 0.75). The third factor, named "electoral rules", concerns variables that are relevant for the electoral system: if countries have uninominal majority system or proportional representation and in mixed electoral systems (correlations over 0.66). The residual factor, named "chief executive factor", contains variables which are relevant to characterize the tenure and turnover of the executive power: how many years the chief executive has been in office and years left in current term (correlations are above 0.58). 
Regression Analysis
After having identified the relevant group of variables in factors, we aim at evaluating the relative importance of each factor as determinants of the CBI index. Therefore, we conduct linear regression analysis where the identified dimensions are the independent variables and the CBIW index is the dependent one. Results are shown in Table 3 .
The financial factor defined by the national deficit and IMF lending enters negatively and significantly in all the specifications, i.e. in full sample models and in both OECD and non-OECD restricted models. Taking in mind the correlations between this factor and variables (seen in Table Table 3 also suggests that economies with less deficit show a higher CBI (see also Table 1 for the relation between the financial factor and deficit). The commitment literature suggests that CBI should be a mechanism for signalling the anti-inflationary creditworthiness of governments to international investors. Countries with a weak public budget suffer from an excessive inflationary bias, which may increase the interest burden. Therefore, the benefits from commitment will tend to be larger (see, Cukierman, 1992) . In this context, the expected sign for the deficit should be positive. However, our negative sign may be explained as follows. The central bank lending to the government, for example of short terms loans, has increased during the periods of financial instability (e.g. the Great 2007-2008 financial crises), since a number of governments have turned to central banks for money as government liabilities increased, tax revenues declined, and financing for fiscal imbalances from domestic and international capital markets was expensive or unavailable. Hence, during deep financial crises, recession and long period of low inflation (e.g. 2008-2012 period) , society becomes accustomed to deficit monetization, thereby reducing opposition to deficit and public pressure for an independent central bank.
To summarize, IMF loans program works like an "external constraint" for the economies with high deficit and more incentive to monetize it, but the financial instability and recession in a period of low inflation (or deflation) work in the opposite direction with governments relying extensively on central bank money to finance public expenditure. Hence, central banks' political and operational autonomy is inevitably undermined for the fulfillment of their policy objective of preserving price stability.
Now we focus on the institutional factors. Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) state that "there is no evidence that countries with more robust political institutions strengthened the independence of their central banks, perhaps because the level of CBI was already high". This is true for OECD economies. However, Table 3 shows that the political factor (e.g. freedom of speech, trust in legal system) enters negatively and significantly in the specification for non-OECD countries: the less is the strength of political institution, the higher is the incentive to delegate to an independent central bank, except for corruption. In fact, greater the level of corruption, higher is the incentive to delegate to an independent central bank.
Furthermore, for non-OECD economies, the goverment factor also enters negatively and significantly. We recall that it only relates to the strength of the first-largest goverment party with respect to the total number of seats of the goverment coalition. This evidence, together with the results in Table 1 , leads to the following consideration.
Economies with strong first-largest goverment party have less incentive to delegate to an independent central bank. This is in line with the literature on the political economy approach to the CBI, (see Fernández-Albertos, 2015, and Eijffinger, 2017) . It suggests that the delegation to an independent central bank is a way to facilitate the cohesistence of actors with heterogeneous preferences within the executive, i.e. coalition or minority goverment, in particular when information asymmetries are present, for example, between coalition goverment parties and the executive. Moreover, multiparty goverment are heavily dependent on the use of fiscal policy, and this increase the incentive to delegate in the hands of an independent institution (non-targetable) the monetary policy or unpopular policies maximising the probability to be re-elected.
Finally, the opposition, electoral rule and chief executive factors are not statistically significant, but they design a coherent picture reinforcing the comment above. The opposition factor describes the relative weight of the three-largest opposition parties to the first-largest goverment party, that is, the degree of political fragmentation and the possible heterogeneity of preferences with the risk that intra-party conflicts over policy threaten the stability of a goverment. The fragmentation is greater in countries with mixed electoral system, i.e. partly majority based and partly proportional based. In fact, they are generally characterized by a stricter control over the goverment made by the opposition (captured by the electoral factor). The party political instability may be more dramatic if the executive power is characterized by low tenure or high turnover. Leaders with shorter period in office are more likely to make opportunistic decisions that entails long-run costs to society that outweigh short-run benefits (captured by the chief executive factor). Table 3 . Linear regression analysis for the assessment of CBI determinants. Note. Estimated coefficients in table and relative p-values in parenthesis. The basic model refers to the following specification: CBIi= b0 + ∑k b1k Pk + ui, where i is the country-index and Pk is the kth factor extracted from the economic and political groups of variables (see Table 1 ). The augmented model refers to the following specification: CBIi = b0+ ∑k b1k Pk+ ∑j b2j Fj + ui, where i is the country-index, Pk and Fj are the kth factor extracted from the economic and political groups of variables (see Table 1 ) and the jth factor extracted from the institutional group of variables (see Table 2 ), respectively. The symbols *, **, *** denote significance level at 6%, 5%, 1%, respectively.
Basic Model

Conclusion
In this paper we have implemented well-known statistical tools such as factorial and regression analysis to identify the determinants of a new CBI index from a large database of economic, political and institutional variables. The combination of these techniques has been used to synthesize information firstly and then to overcome limitations such as omitted variables, multicollinearity and overfitting. Our sample includes data for 31 OECD and 49 non-OECD economies and covers the period 1998-2010. The results confirm the role of the IMF loans program as an international constraint that seems to guide all the economies in their choice of independent ccntral banks. However, financial instability, recession and low inflation work in the opposite direction with governments relying extensively on central bank money to finance public expenditure. Central banks' political and operational autonomy is inevitably undermined for the fulfillment of their policy objective of preserving price stability. Finally, for non-OECD economies, the degree of CBI responds to various measures of strength of political institutions and party political instability. Non-OECD countries with more party political instability due to heterogeneous political contexts have a higher incentive to delegate to a more independent central bank or, in other words, economies with strong first-largest goverment party have less incentive to delegate to an independent monetary authority. The importance of these political and institutional factors suggest that the adoption of an independent central bank should be understood not only in terms of economic efficiency but also in terms of political convenience, as also stressed by Fernández-Albertos (2015) .
